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THE UNRECOGNIZED GOVERNMENT OR STATE IN
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW'
By EDWIN D. Dicxi-sox*
Two years ago an American citizen who had been a resident of
Mexico for many years died intestate in Mexico City. The widow
was appointed administratrix by one of the Mlexican civil courts.
Finding among the papers a number of notes executed by an Amer-
ican corporation payable to the deceased, the administratrix began
an action in New York to have whatever was due upon the notes
paid to the estate. The corporation's attorneys moved for judgment
on the pleadings, contending that an administratrix appointed by a
Mexican court can maintain no action in courts of the United States
so long as the executive of the United States declines to recognize
the government functioning in Mexico. The Supreme Court of New
York granted this motion.2 Having procured letters of administra-
tion in New York, the widow then moved to amend her pleadings
by dropping her status as administratrix appointed in Mexico and
asserting the status acquired under New York law. On this motion
the Supreme Court favored the widow,3 but on appeal to the Appel-
late Division the order was reversed and the widow's motion denied.4
The Appellate Division took the view that since the appointment in
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
'This paper has already appeared in French translation in the Rzvu4 Dx
DROIT rNTtRNATxONAL T Dz L-GSrATON CO1PARP1X, 3d series, Vol. IV, pp.
145-,78. Acknowledgments are due the editors and publishers of that period-
ical for permission to reproduce the paper here. Advantage has been taken
of another publication to make a few minor corrections, to incorporate a dis-
cussion of a few cases which have been reported since the former publication,
and to add a number of citations which may be of interest to readers in this
country.-THn AUTHOR.
2 New York Supreme Court, Trial Term, New York County (1922). The
author has seen no official report of this opinion. A copy of the opinion, repro-
duced infra, note 5, was made available through the courtesy of counsel.
a 193 N. Y. Supp. 675 (1922).
4 1.93 N. Y. Supp. 676 (1922). Semble that a motion to substitute would
have been equally futile. See also 196 N. Y. Supp. 342 (1922).
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Mexico must be regarded in New York as a mere nullity there was
nothing whatever to amend.
From the decision of this novel case, reported as PcLder v. United
Dredging Co., we may infer that the New York courts regard unrec-
ognized Mexico as a sort of legal vacuum. In granting the corpora-
tion's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Supreme Court said:
"The administratrix plaintiff is an officer of a foreign court. * * *
It is syllogistically true that if the foreign court- has no recognized
power here she may not assert a right derived through her appoint-
ment therefrom. * * * The Mexican government is not de facto
here, since recognition alone can make it so. It may have all the
attributes of a ruling faction, a colony, a district of people, or main-
tain any other form of suzerainty in its established domain, but its
power as a government remains nil without our patent of recogni-
tion. As the parent of the court it cannot have notice, either judicial
or administrative, and surely the creature cannot be possessed of a
power not given its creator. The duty to declare the legal incapacity
to sue is paramount to a consideration of the evils attendant upon
the failure of justice resultant upon this policy of international
relations."5 It was apparently immaterial, in the court's view, that in
fact Mexico existed south of the Rio Grande and that in fact it pos-
5 The text of Mr. Justice McAvoy's opinion, without omissions, is as fol-
lows: "The administratrix plaintiff is an officer of a foreign court. She exer-
cises her function ex vigore the government of her origin, and has no separate
existence such as an executor has through the appointment of a testamentary
script. Hence it is syllogistically true that if the foreign court has no recog-
nized power here she may not assert a right derived through her appointment
therefrom. The foreign court is erected in Mexico, whose present government
is not yet admitted to recognition as a sovereign by our federal authority. It
seems obvious that judicial power cannot be contemplated as in an existence
apart from the sovereignty under the sway of which it operates. It is but a
branch of government, coeval and coexistent therewith, without distinct entity
or being. The Mexican government is not de facto here, since recognition
alone can make it so. It may have all the attributes of a ruling faction, a
colony, a district of people, or maintain any other form of suzerainty in its
established domain, but its power as a government remains nil without our
patent of recognition. As the parent of the court it cannot have notice, either
judicial or administrative, and surely the creature cannot be possessed of a
power not given its creator. The duty to declare the legal incapacity to sue
is paramount to a consideration of the evils attendant upon the failure of jus-
tice resultant upon this policy of international relations. It is imperative to
sustain the motion for judgment by the defendant."
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sessed a more or less effective government which included courts and
a system of law. Until the United States Department of State had
admitted, by word or act, that Mexico possessed a government, the
New York courts felt constrained to remain legally ignorant and
legally incapable of being enlightened.
Such an attitude on the part of courts toward an unrecognized
government or state has certain significant consequences. It requires
that courts ignore important facts until the executive has seen fit to
recognize them as such. It makes important private rights depend
almost entirely upon the executive pleasure. In situations like that
presented in the Pelzer case, it admittedly results in a miscarriage
of justice. Is such an attitude required by sound legal doctrine or
the established precedents of the law?
II
The development of modern judicial doctrine in regard to unrec-
ognized governments or states began, for British and American
courts, in the period of rapid political change which followed the
French revolution. In 18o4, the City of Berne in Switzerland sought
to have the British High Court of Chancery restrain the Bank of
England and the South Sea Company from transferring certain
funds which had belonged to the old government of Berne before
the revolution. It was objected that since the new government of
Switzerland had not been recognized by Great Britain it could not
be noticed by the court. Lord Eldon refused relief, observing,
according to the reporter, "that he was much struck with the objec-
tion; and it was extremely difficult to say, a judicial Court can take
notice of a Government, never authorized by the Government of the
Country, in which that Court sits; and whether, the foreign govern-
ment is recognized, or not, is matter of public notoriety."6 The
reporter adds that a foreign government must be recognized by the
British government before it can sue in British courts, and that
"this was repeatedly declared by Lord Eldon, with respect to the
The recent recognition of the government of Mexico (September, 1923)
will be retroactive in effect and a different result may be reached now without
difficulty in cases of this type. See infra, note 43.
6 The City of Berne in Switzerland v. The Bank of England, 9 Ves. 347.
See also Dolder v. Bank of England, Io Ves. 352 (1805); Dolder v. Lord
Huntingfield, ii Ves. 283-(i8o5).
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new governments of South America, before their independence of
Spain was completely established and formally acknowledged by
the British cabinet." 7
It will be recalled that the revolution in France was followed by
a period of insurrection and turmoil in the French colony comprising
what is now Haiti and Santo Domingo. Insurgents gained actual
control of most of the island. The question soon arose as to how
the courts should regard the de facto situation thus created. In 1805,
in the case of The Happy Couple,8 a British court at Halifax con-
demned an American ship for carrying contraband to the insurgents
because it found nothing to indicate that the British government had
recognized any portion of the island as having any other character
than that of a French colony. In the cases of The Manilla,9 decided
in i8o8, and The Pelican,-0 decided in 18o9, British courts held that
ports controlled by the insurgents should not be regarded as colonial
ports of France within the meaning of orders in council subjecting
neutral ships to condemnation for trading from colonial ports of the
enemy. There was no departure, however, from the principle applied
in The Happy Coumple, for the courts in these later cases construed
other orders in council as amounting to a recognition on the part of
the British government of the de facto situation. In the cabe of
The Pelican, the court expressly declared that "it always belongs to
the government of the country to determine in what relation any
other country stands towards it." "That is a point," remarked the
judge, "upon which Courts of Justice cannot decide."
The leading American cases on unrecognized governments or
states grew out of these same insurrections in Haiti and Santo
Domingo. It will be worth while, in view of their importance as
precedents and their influence upon the later development of judicial
doctrine, to scrutinize these early cases somewhat carefully. In the
first case, Rose v. Hinmely," decided in i8og, an American merchant-
man had procured a cargo in ports controlled by the insurgents and
had later been captured by a French privateer at a place more than
ten leagues off the Dominican coast. The privateer took the mer-
" 9 Ves. 347 n.
S Stewart's Reports, 65.
9 Edw. Adm. :r.
-o Bdw. Adm., App. D.
114 Cranch, 241.
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cbantman into a Spanish port in Cuba, where ship and cargo were
sold under authority from a person styling himself agent in Cuba of
the French government of Santo Domingo. The purchaser at this
sale took the cargo into the United States, where it was claimed by
the original American owner. The ship and cargo were subsequently
condemned by a French tribunal in Santo Domingo for violating a
decree of the French government prohibiting trade with the insur-
gents. When the case of Rose v. Himely came before the United
States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall proceeded to inquire
into the French tribunal's jurisdiction, and preliminary to that inquiry
he desired to know whether the tribunal's sentence purported to be
an adjudication of belligerent right or simply an application of
municipal regulation. He began by taking account of the de facto
situation. "In making this inquiry," he said, "the relative situation
of St. Domingo and France must necessarily be considered. The
colony of St. Domingo, originally belonging to France, had broken
the bond which connected her with the parent state, had declared her-
self independent, and was endeavoring to support that independence
by arms. France still asserted her claim of sovereignty, and had
employed a military -force in support of that claim. A war de facto
then unquestionably existed between France and St. Domingo."'12
Having taken cognizance of the de facto situation, and having
observed that the French tribunal might have pronounced its judg-
ment either as a prize court or as a court enforcing a municipal reg-
ulation, he proceeded to ascertain the true nature of the judgment
by examining relevant acts of the French authorities.
Counsel for the claimant urged the court to go much further
124 Cranch 241, 272. See also Consul of Spain v. The Conception, 6 Fed.
Cas. 359 (i819); La Conception, 6 Wh. 235 (1821). In United States v.
Hutchings, 2 Wheeler's Crim. Cas. 543 (1817), in which the prisoner was
indicted for piracy and tried before Chief Justice Marshall sitting in the
United States Circuit Court, the accused had sailed under commissions from
the revolutionary government of Buenos Ayres and had made captures of
Spanish ships. The attorney for the prosecution objected to the accused's
commissions going to the jury, inter alia, because there was no proof that
Buenos Ayres was an independent government. Chief Justice Marshall
observed that before the judiciary could consider Buenos Ayres as independent
and capable of having a national seal it must be recognized by the executive.
He decided, however, that the commissions could go to the jury merely as
papers found on board the accused's ship. In about ten minutes the jury
returned a verdict of not guilty.
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than this. They contended that since the insurgent colony had
declared itself a sovereign state and had thus far maintained its
sovereignty by arms, it ought to be regarded by other nations as
sovereign in fact and therefore entitled to maintain the same inter-
course with the world that is maintained by other belligerent nations.
It was in reply to this extreme contention that Chief Justice Marshall
uttered the famous dictum which has come to be regarded by courts
as a classical statement of the rule in regard to recognition. He said:
"It is for governments to decide whether they will consider St.
Domingo as an independent nation, and until such decision shall be
made, or France shall relinquish her claim, courts of justice must
consider the ancient state of things as remaining unaltered, and the
sovereign power of France over that colony as still subsisting."'
3
The Chief Justice concluded that the French tribunal had con-
demned for breach of municipal regulation and that it had no author-
ity to condemn for such an offense an American ship seized on the
high seas and never carried within French jurisdiction.14 It followed
that the original owner was entitled to recover his cargo. Before
leaving this case, it ought to be observed that Chief Justice Mar-
shall's famous statement in regard to recognition was obiter dictum
and that there was nothing to indicate its approval by more than two
of the seven justices. It was uttered in connection with a decision
almost immediately overruled on every essential point.15 Conceding
that it was sound as a statement of general principle, it is note-
worthy that it was formulated in a case in which, in one of the most
delicate situations involving an unrecognized government or state-
a situation in which the colony of a friendly state had revolted and
was seeking to establish its independence by arms-the great justice
Is4 Cranch, 241, 272. This dictum has been quoted many times as a state-
ment of controlling principle in cases which were in no important respect like
Rose v. Himely.
14 The Chief Justice based his decision upon the proposition that an Amer-
ican ship could not be lawfully seized by the French on the high seas for vio-
lating a French municipal regulation. Three justices concurred in reliance
upon the proposition that an American vessel seized by the French for vio-
lating a municipal regulation could not be lawfully condemned by the French
tribunal while lying in the port of another nation. Two justices dissented.
The propositions invoked by the Chief Justice and the concurring justices,
respectively, were both repudiated by the Supreme Court in Hudson v. Gues-
tier, 4 Cranch, 293 (i8o8), 6 Cranch, 281 (1810).
15 Hudson v. Guestier, supra.
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who announced it manifested no diffidence about taking cognizance
of the de facto relation between the colony in question and the
mother country.
Three years after Rose v. Himely was decided, the case of Clark
v. United States, 6 arising under the non-importation act of 1809,
xeached the circuit court. The act of 18o9 prohibited the importa-
tion into the United States of any goods "from any port or place
situated in France, or in any of her colonies or dependencies." The
goods in question were imported from Santo Domingo, long since
under the complete de facto control of the revolutionists. Was Santo
Domingo to be regarded as a colony or dependency of France within
the meaning of the statute? The claimant relied upon the de facto
independence of Santo Domingo; but the court held that the non-
importation act applied. Mr. Justice Washington said: "These argu-
ments, on the side of the appellants, had great weight with us, when
they were urged; and we must candidly confess, that they lost nothing
by the examination which we have given the subject during the vaca-
tion. But they seem to us to be so completely borne down by the
opinion of the Supreme Court, pronounced in the case of Rose v.
Hinely, that it is impossible, we think, to sustain them, without dis-
regarding principles most clearly expressed in that opinion."
' "7
Even if Rose v. Himely had not already been decisively over-
ruled, its actual decision certainly fell far short of a controlling
precedent for Clark v. United States. There were good reasons,
however, for applying Marshall's dictum in the latter case. For one
reason, the non-importation act applied expressly to French "colonies
and dependencies." Presumptively, a district regarded by France
as a dependency and so recognized by the United States would be
included. And this presumption was confirmed as regards Santo
Domingo by the history of non-intercourse and non-importation
legislation."" For another reason, Clark v. United States seems
163 Wash. C. C. ioi.
173 Wash. C. C. ioi, 102.
Is The non-importation act (2 STAT. AT L. 528) superseded the embargo
act (2 ibid. 451), which in turn superseded an act of 18o6 (2 ibid. 351, 421)
expressly prohibiting all commercial intercourse with any part of Santo
Domingo "not in possession, and under the acknowledged government of
France." The act of i8o6 is said to have been passed in consequence of a
remonstrance from the French government.
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clearly to have presented one of those delicate political situations in
which the court ought to follow the political departments. The
political departments had recognized and dealt with the French
government as having authority at the place in question. The posi-
tion of the revolutionists would have been materially strengthened,
to the disadvantage of the French government and the consequent
embarrassment of the United States government, if the court had
permitted the de facto situation to take Santo Domingo out of the
operation of the statute.
The condition of revolution and civil war which had become
chronic in Haiti and Santo Domingo continued for many years to
perplex both the political departments of the United States govern-
ment and its courts. The United States Neutrality Act of 1794
made it unlawful to fit out and arm ships with the intent that they
should be employed "in the service of any foreign prince or state"
against the subjects of "another foreign prince or state" with whom
the United States was at peace. In Gelston v. Hoyt,9 an action of
trespass for seizing a ship, decided in i8i8, the defendants justified
as public officers making a seizure under the neutrality statute.
They offered to prove that the ship had been fitted out and armed
with the intent that it should be employed in the service of that part
of Santo Domingo which was then under the de facto government
of Petion against the subjects of that part which was under Chris-
tophe. It was not shown that either government had been recog-
nized by the political departments as a "foreign prince or state."
The Supreme Court held that the evidence offered by the defendants
was properly rejected. Mr. Justice Story said: "if the court was
bound to admit the evidence, as it stood, without this additional
proof, it must have been upon the ground that it was bound to take
judicial notice of the relations of the country with foreign states,
and to decide affirmatively, that Petion and Christophe were foreign
princes, within the purview of the statute. No doctrine is better
established, than that it belongs exclusively to governments to recog-
nize new states, in the revolutions which may occur in the world;
and until such recognition, either by our own government, or the
government to which the new state belonged, courts of justice are
bound to consider the ancient state of things as remaining unal-
193 Wh. 246.
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tered."20 Justice Story relied upon Rose v. .Himely, citing also The
Manilla and Tie City of Berne v. The Bank of England.
It seems clear that the decision in Gelston v. Hoyt was correct.
The Neutrality Act of 1794 applied only where a "foreign prince or
state" was affected. 2 If the court had regarded unrecognized revo-
lutionists as a "foreign prince or state," within the meaning of the
statute, virtually it would have anticipated the decision of a most
delicate and difficult question falling exclusively within the compe-
tence of the political departments of government.
In this wise the early cases established the principle that in Eng-
lish and American law at least the decision of questions of recogni-
tion belongs exclusively to the political departments of government.
For the judiciary, it was admitted that courts are not equipped to
decide such questions, 2 that considerations of policy prevent them
from pursuing in respect to matters involving recognition a course
which is not in harmony with that pursued by the political depart-
ment,23 in brief, that questions of recognition are exclusively polit-
ical and that when they are really involved in litigation the court's
only duty is to inform itself as to the decision made by competent
political authorities and act accordingly.2
2 3 Wh. 246, 324. See also United States v. Palmer, 3 Wh. 6Io (1818);
The Divina Pastora, 4 Wh. 52 (i8ig).
21 In the Neutrality Act of iSiS (3 STAr. AT L. 447), Congress expressly
enlarged the scope of the statute so that it would apply, not only where
breach of neutrality affected any "foreign prince or state," but also where it
affected any "colony, district, or people." See The Three Friends, 166 U. S.
I (1896). See also the British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819, 59 Geo. III,
c. 69; The Salvador, L. R. 3 P. C. 218 (1870).
22 See Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. 38, 51 (1852); Republic of Peru v.
Peruvian Guano Co., 36 Ch. D. 489, 497 (1887).
23 See Thompson v. Powles, 2 Sim. 194, 212 (1828); Taylor v. Barclay, 2
Sim. 213, 221 (1828) ; The Hornet, 12 Fed. Cas. 529 (187o) ; The Rogdai, 278
Fed. 294, 296 (192o).
24 In addition to the cases cited above in notes 22 and 23, see The City
of Berne v. The Bank of England, Rose v. Himely, and Gelston v. Hoyt,
discussed supra. More recent cases are discussed infra. Compare The Char-
kieh, L. R. 4 A. & E. 59 (1873), in which the court entered into an exhaustive
inquiry into the status of the Khedive of Egypt, although informed by the for-
eign office that the Khedive had not been recognized, with Mighell v. Sultan
of Johore [1894], I Q. B. 149, 158, i6o, i61, in which the course pursued in
The Charkieh was disapproved. See also Berdahl, "The Power of Recogni-
tion," 14 Am. JouR. INT. LAW, 519.
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A similar judicial incompetence to make political decisions affect-
ing the conduct of foreign relations was established at an early date
in respect to other matters. Thus it came to be well settled that a
question of diplomatic character is exclusively for the executive to
decide. The question is political and a certificate from the appro-
priate executive department is conclusive. -3 It is equally well settled
that when an international boundary is ifi dispute the courts will
accept and apply the conclusions announced by the political authori-
ties of their own state.2-  If the authorities charged with the conduct
of foreign relations deny sovereignty, the courts will deny it." If
See BLUNTSCHLI, V6LreRRECHT, § 122; DESPAGNET, COURS DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL PUBLIC, 4th ed., § 83; LE NORMAND, LA RECONNAISSANCE INTERNA-
TIONALE Et" SES DIVERSES APPLICATIONS, pp. 277--85; and WIEssE, Le DROIT
INTERNATIONAL APPLIQUL- AUX GUERRES CIVILES, §§ 9, 33, indicating that the
same principle applies in other countries. Bluntschli says: "Die Frage der
Anerkennung einer auswirtigen Regierung wird in den modernen Staten durch-
weg von den inl5ndischen Regierungen entschieden; und es haben sich dann die
Landesgerichte auch in internationalen Processen nach diesem Entscheide zu
richten."
25 See United States v. Liddle, 2 Wash. C. C. 205 (i8o8); United States
v. Ortega, 4 Wash. C. C. 531 (1825) ; United States v. Benner, Baldwin 234
(183o) ; Ex parte Hitz, iri U. S. 766 (1884); In re Baiz, 135 U. S. 403
(189o) ; United States v. Trumbull, 48 Fed. 94 (1891) ; The Rogday, 279 Fed.
130 (192o) ; Savie v. City of New York, 193 N. Y. Supp. 577 (1922).
26 Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829); Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet.
511 (1838) ; United States v. Lynde, ii Wall. 632 (187o). "In a controversy
between two nations concerning- hational boundary, it is scarcely possible that
the courts of either should refuse to abide by the measures adopted by its
own government. There being no common tribunal to decide between them,
each determines for itself on its own rights, and if they cannot adjust their
differences peaceably, the right remains with the strongest. The judiciary is
not that department of the government, to which the assertion of its interests
against foreign powers is confided; and its duty commonly is to decide upon
individual rights, according to those principles which the political departments
of the nation have established. If the course of the nation has been a plain
one, its courts would hesitate to pronounce it erroneous." 2 Pet. 253, 307.
27 "And can there be any doubt, that when the executive branch of the
government, which is charged with our foreign relations, shall in its corre-
spondence with a foreign nation assume a fact in regard to the sovereignty
of any island or country, it is conclusive on the judicial department? And in
this view it is not material to inquire, nor is it the province of the court to
determine, whether the executive be right or wrong. It is enough to know,
that in the exercise of his constitutional functions, he has decided the question.
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the authorities charged with the conduct of foreign relations assert
sovereignty, the courts will assert it.28
III
The decided cases are clear enough as regards the rule that courts
are incompetent to decide questions of recognition, but they are far
from clear as regards the principles which define the rule and delimit
its application. On the one hand, although the judiciary is undoubt-
edly influenced by a desire to avoid embarrassing the executive in the
conduct of foreign relations, it is not simply because of the possi-
bility of international complications that courts consider themselves
incompetent to make such decisions. British and American courts,
on the contrary, have long boasted of their competence to decide
cases so complicated internationally as to require the application of
international law.29 They decide, for example, cases involving neu-
tral rights and obligations in time of war, cases involving the inter-
pretation of treaties, cases involving the rights and liabilities of resi-
dent aliens, and cases involving the immunities from jurisdiction of
the sovereigns, diplomatic representatives, or public ships of other
states. Such cases certainly have international complications, and on
occasion the decisions may prove a source of embarrassment to the
executive in the conduct of foreign affairs. It is not because of inter-
national complications alone that courts "crook the pregnant hinges of
the knee" to the executive or legislative branches of government.
Having done this under the responsibilities which belong to him, it is obliga-
tory on the people and government of the Union.
"If this were not the rule, cases might often arise in which, on the most
important questions of foreign jurisdiction, there would be an irreconcilable
difference between the executive and judicial departments. By one of these
departments, a foreign island or country might be considered as at peace with
the United States; whilst the other would consider it in a state of war. No
well regulated government has ever sanctioned a principle so unwise and so
destructive of national character." Williams v. The Suffolk Insurance Co.,
"13 Pet. 415, 420 (1839). See also Poster v. Globe Venture Syndicate, 69 L. J.
Ch. 375, 377 (I9oo).
2 8 Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202 (i8go) ; In re Cooper, 143 U. S.
472 (I892). See also United States v. Yorba, I Wall. 412 (1863) ; Pearcy v.
Stranahan, 205 U. S. 257 (907).
29 Triquet v. Bath, 3 Burr. 1478 (1764); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.
S. 677 (igoo) ; The Zamora [916], 2 A. C. 77. But see West Rand Central
Gold Mining Co. v. Rex [i9o5], 2 K. B. 391; PiccioTro, THE RELATiON or
INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND AND or THE UNITED STATES.
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On the other hand, it is not because courts are constrained to
receive all their intelligence of facts affecting international relations
through the medium of a foreign office or a state department. They
are not so restricted. They take cognizance of de facto situations
at home or abroad, whether related to the conduct of foreign affairs
or not, whenever it is possible for them to do so without becoming
improperly involved in the decision of a political question. Attention
may well be called to some of the more important instances in which
de facto situations of international significance have been permitted
to determine the outcome of litigation.
It will be recalled that Chief justice Marshall took cognizance of
a delicate de facto situation abroad in the much cited case of Rose
v. Hintely.80 In the case of Keene v. M'Doarough,3" a suit in the
United States Supreme Court involving lands in Louisiana, the
defendant relied upon the adjudication of a Spanish tribunal made
after the cession of Louisiana to the United States but before the
United States had actually taken possession. In affirming a judg-
ment for the defendant, the court said: "The adjudication having
been made by a Spanish tribunal, after the cession of the country to
the United States, does not make it void; for we know, historically,
that the actual possession of the territory was not surrendered until
some time after these proceedings took place. It was the judgment,
therefore, of a competent Spanish tribunal, having jurisdiction of the
case, and rendered whilst the country, although ceded, was, de facto,
in the possession of Spain, and subject to Spanish laws. Such judg-
ments, so far as they affect the private rights of the parties thereto,
must be deemed valid."32
In United States v. Rice,3 3 a case which came up for decision
soon after the War of 1812, the defendant had imported goods into
the American port of Castine while it was occupied by British forces
and had paid the duties levied by British officials. After the conclu-
sion of peace the United States reassumed jurisdiction at Castine and
the collector demanded payment of American duties on the same
30 4 Cranch, 24f. See also United States v. Hutchings, supra, note 12,
and Consul of Spain v. The Conception, 6 Fed. Cas. 359. Justice Washington
seemed reluctant to ignore the facts in as clear a case as Clark v. United States,
3 Wash. C. C. ioi, discussed supra.
318 Pet. 3o8 (1834).
32 8 Pet. 308, 310.
33 4 W\Vh - 246 (1839).
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goods. Although the United States government had contested in
war the British occupation, and although the government was now
the party plaintiff claiming a second payment of duties, the United
States Supreme Court took full cognizance of the de facto situation
at Castine during the war and held unanimously that the govern-
ment's claim could not be sustained. Delivering the opinion of the
court, Mr. Justice Story said: "By the conquest and military occu-
pation of Castine, the enemy acquired that firm possession which
enabled him to exercise the fullest rights of sovereignty over that
place. The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was,
of course, suspended. and the laws of the United States could no
longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhab-
itants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the sur-
render the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the
British government, and were bound by such laws, and such only,
as it chose to recognise and impose. From the nature of the case, no
other laws could be obligatory upon them, for where there is no pro-
tection or allegiance or sovereignty, there can be no claim to obe-
dience. Castine was, therefore, during this period, so far as respected
our revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port; and goods imported
into it by the inhabitants, were subject to such duties only as the
British government chose to require."34
After the Civil War in the United States there arose numerous
cases requiring the courts to determine how they should regard the
late Confederate government. and what significance they should
attribute to its acts. The belligerency of the Confederacy had of
course been conceded, but otherwise its status had not been substan-
tially different from that of an unrecognized de facto government
or state. In Thorington v. Smith,"5 the United States Supreme
Court held that effect should be given to a contract made during the
rebellion, between residents of Alabama, to sell land in Alabama,
the purchase price to be paid in Confederate currency. The court
relied upon the de facto character of the Confederate government,
844 Wh. 246, 254. It is noteworthy that the United States has insisted
upon the application of the same principle where duties are paid to unrecog-
nized insurgents in de facto control of a foreign port of entry. The Mazatlan
Case, :[ Moore, Digest, 49 (1873) ; The Bluefields Case, i ibid. 49 (1899-i9o0).
See also MacLeod v. United States, 229 U. S. 416 (1913). Compare Fleming
v. Page, 9 How. 603 (I85O).
35 8 Wall. 1 (1868).
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described it as a government by paramount force similar to that
established by the British at Castine during the War of 1812, and
declared that obedience to its authority in civil and local matters was
not only a matter of necessity but a matter of duty.
The United States Court of Claims decided, in The Home Insur-
ance Company's Case," that a corporation created by act of the
Georgia legislature while Georgia was in rebellion was capable of
claiming and recovering the proceeds of cotton captured by United
States military forces during the war. The corporation's capacity
was challenged, but it was held that it had a valid existence entitling
it to maintain the suit. The general principle was formulated as
follows: "Whatever act of the legislature of a rebel State did not tend
to further or support the rebellion, or to defeat the just rights of citi-
zens, but related merely to the domestic affairs of the people of the
State as a community, aside from the connection of that people with
the rebellion, is a valid act by a de facto though unlawful govern-
ment, which will be sustained in the courts of the United States."' ' ,
In affirming the decision of the Court of Claims, the Supreme Court
observed that any other doctrine would "work great and unnecessary
hardship upon the people of those states, without any corresponding
benefit to the citizens of other States, and without any advantage to
the national government." 318
A situation similar to the one precipitated in the United States
by the outbreak of the Civil War arose in South Africa during the
Boer War. Long before the war ended the British government pro-
claimed the annexation of the South African Republic. Of course
no British court could recognize the existence of the Republic after
that event. But in a case involving title to a quantity of wool con-
fiscated and sold by de facto Boer authorities, the Supreme Court of
the Transvaal later examined the laws and orders of the de facto
a6 8 Ct. Cl. 449 (872).
3 8 Ct. Cl. 449, 450.
1 United States v. Insurance Companies, 22 Wall. 99, io3 (1874). See
also Mauran v. Insurance Co., 6 Wall. I (1867) ; Delmas v. Insurance Co., 14
Wall. 661 (1871); Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 594 (1878); Ketchum v. Buckley,
99 U. S. 188 (1878); Baldy v. Hunter, i71 U. S. 388 (I898). Compare Texas
v. White, 7 Wall. 700 (1868) ; Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall. 342 (1870); Han-
auer v. Woodruff, 15 Wall. 439 (1872); Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570
(1873) ; Sprott v. United States, 2o Wall. 459 (1874) ; Williams v. Bruffy, 96
U. S. 176 (877) ; Lamar v. Micou, 112 U. S. 452 (1884).
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Boer government in order to determine the validity of the act of
confiscation 9 And in another case the same court held that the
owner's title to property useful in war had been effectively divested
through confiscation by the de facto authorities. The court said:
"Although the late Government was one which this Court cannot
recognise, yet the burghers of the late -Free State were a body of
'men bound together in fighting for a common cause, and in any case
exercising control over that part of the country where they happened
to be carrying on operations.
40
In the cases reviewed-cases arising out of the Spanish possession
of Louisiana after cession to the United States, the British military
occupation of Castine during the War of 1812, the establishment of
de facto governments in the South during the Civil War in the
United States, and the continued existence of the Boer government
in South Africa after the annexation proclamation-the courts were
not asked to decide political questions. They were asked to take
account of facts- in adjudicating private rights. It was obviously
proper that they should do so. Had they ignored the facts they
would have projected the judicial process into the realm of unreality
in which an unfortunate miscarriage of justice would have been the
only sure result.
In Yrisarri v. Clement,4 ' an action for libel decided by the Eng-
lish Court of Common Pleas in 1825, we have a situation which is
more obviously relevant, indeed, than the situations considered above.
The plaintiff claimed that defamatory matter had been published con-
cerning his activity in endeavoring to raise a loan for Chile, of which
he claimed to be the duly appointed diplomatic representative.
He offered evidence that Chile was a state. It was objected that the
court must take judicial notice of the circumstance that Chile
belonged to Spain. But Chief Justice Best said: "It occurs to me at
present, that there is this distinction. If a foreign state is recognized
by this country, it is not necessary to prove, that it is an existing state;
but if it is not so recognized, such proof becomes necessary. * * * I
take the rule to be this-if a body of persons assemble together to
protect themselves, and support their own independence, and make
laws, and have Courts of Justice, that is evidence of their being a state.
39 Van Deventer v. Hancke and Mossop, Transvaal L. R. [i9o3], T. S. 401.
40 Lemrkuhl v. Kock, Transvaal L. R. [19o3], T. S. 451, 454.
412 Carr. & Payne, 223 (825).
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We have had, certainly, some evidence here today that these provinces
formerly belonged to Spain; but it would be a strong thing to say,
that because they once belonged, therefore they must always belong.
* * * It makes no difference whether they formerly belonged to Spain,
if they do not continue to acknowledge it, and are in possession of a
force sufficient to support themselves in opposition to it. ' ' 4 2 When
the case came up again on motion for a nonsuit, it was held that
calling Chile a state in the alleged libel was an admission on the
part of the defendant which made further proof unnecessary. Had
there been no such admission, however, proof of the de facto exist-
ence of the Chilean government should have been enough, for the
libel suit did not require a decision on the question of recognition,
and surely libel is as injurious to the representative of a de facto
government as to anyone else.
It should be noted, finally, that courts always take account of
the facts after the event, even in cases in which a question of recog-
nition has been clearly involved. They attain this salutary result by
means of the fiction of retroactivity. It is incompetent for them to
anticipate the political department's decision; but once recognition
has been granted the courts may treat it as operative ab initio and
so take account of the unrecognized de facto government or state
which existed prior to the political department's action.43 By means
of this fiction, the judiciary has frequently found it possible to do
justice in matters of private right without becoming involved in
political questions. If the decision on recognition is not too long
delayed, the fiction of retroactivity will usually enable the courts to
deal adequately with most of the cases which arise. But the decision,
as we have recently had occasion to know, may be too long delayed.
Then the problem confronting the judiciary becomes more compli-
cated. Then it becomes much more difficult to apply the principle
that recognition or no is a political matter upon which courts must
not venture to decide.
422 Carr. & Payne, 223, 225.
43 Murray v. Vanderbilt, 39 Barb. 14o (1863); Underhill v. Hernandez,
168 U. S. 250 (1897); State of Yucatan v. Argumedo, 157 N. Y. Supp. 2I9
(1915); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1918); Ricaud v.
American Metal Co., 246 U. S. 304 (igi8); Luther v. Sagor & Co. [19211,
I K. B. 456, [1921] 3 K. B. 532. Compare Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. 38
(1852). See 35 HARv. L. Rev. 607; R~v. DtDR. INT., 3d series, III, i5r,
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If it is not simply because of the possibility of international com-
plications that courts consider themselves incompetent to decide
questions of recognition, and if the authority to direct and control
foreign affairs does not give the political departments any general
censorship over the facts at home or abroad of which courts may
take cognizance, how may we expect courts to define the rule and
delimit its application? How, in particular, is the judiciary's sphere
of action to be bounded in more or less involved situations which
seem to be very close to the line?
(To be co2cluded)
